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As society has evolved, businesses, organizations, and communities have
acknowledged and responded to change. Accordingly, the laws of our federal
government have provided avenues, both in interpretation and in legislative
intent, to speak to and address that evolution. Most recently, men and women
have confronted inappropriate conduct that has been tolerated for far too
long. Sexual misconduct has been either ignored or justified within the work-
place, in sports medicine, in education, and backstage. Sexual misconduct
has resulted in individuals feeling extreme mental and physical discomfort,
isolation, inferiority, and fear. Victims of sexual misconduct have both feared
and experienced retaliation for seeking resolution to such a degree that they
have been forced to weigh the level of misery in tolerating abuse versus pun-
ishment for pursuing intervention. Thankfully, the social climate has warmed
to welcoming and supporting victims who can no longer remain silent.
As more individuals find their voice, the search for judicial justice may
also increase. Statutory law has been in place for some time. The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 is a landmark federal law that consists of eleven sections prohib-
iting discrimination in various settings as well as strengthening regulations
that prohibit other discriminatory practices. Title VI prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs receiving federal
financial assistance.1 Title VII prohibits discriminatory practices against em-
ployees on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin, and religion.2 Title
IX, a federal law enacted as part of the Educational Amendments of 1972,
filled the gap left by Title VI by offering protection against discrimination
* J.D. candidate, North Carolina Central University School of Law, 2019. I would like to dedicate this to
my wife, Frances, and our daughters, Allie and Audrey. You are my life’s greatest joy and purpose. Thank
you for your love and support.
1.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
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based on sex/gender in those same educational programs and activities re-
ceiving federal funds.3
There has been conflict among the circuits in interpreting Title IX as it
applies to private actions filed by employees alleging sex discrimination and
their possible remedies. The First and Fourth Circuits have agreed that an
educational employee’s right to file a private action exists under Title IX.4
The First Circuit highlighted legislative intent in its creation of Title IX as
one that fills the gap left by Title VII.5 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit recog-
nized that an implied right of private action is present under Title IX.6 The
Fifth and Seventh Circuits disregarded the First and Fourth Circuits’ earlier
decisions and held that Title VII is the exclusive means of relief for employ-
ees’ private actions for sex discrimination notwithstanding the fact that the
discrimination occurred in an educational institution or setting.7
In Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit began by reversing the lower court’s determination that
Mercy Catholic’s residency program was not an educational program or ac-
tivity.8 The court held that educational institutions are not exclusively on
campus.9 Furthermore, the sweeping language of Title IX broadened the
scope to also include employees as part of the protected class.10 Lastly, the
court ruled that employees may file private actions to protect their own inter-
ests and dismissed the notion that Title VII is the exclusive remedy for em-
ployment sex discrimination.11 In essence, the Third Circuit’s ruling weighed
the conflicting holdings from other federal circuits and widened victims’ path
to be made whole after suffering the indignity and shame of sex discrimina-
tion.
This note will discuss the decision in Mercy Catholic concerning Title IX
as it is written as well as its purpose. Foundational cases that initially inter-
preted Title IX’s meaning and scope will be dissected. Decisions from the
four federal circuits falling on either side of the debate will also be introduced
to fully set the stage as the note proceeds to reflect the possible impact of
Mercy Catholic on possibilities available to employees of federally funded
educational institutions. Finally, the guiding principles presented in Mercy
3. PL 92-318, June 23, 1972, 86 Stat. 235; 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
4. Lippsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1998).
5. Id. at 897.
6. Preston v. Commonwealth of Va. ex rel. New River Comty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir.1994).
7. Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995);Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857 (7th
Cir. 1996).
8. Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 558 (3rd Cir. 2017).
9. Id. at 555.
10. Id. at 562.
11. Id.
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Catholic will be employed to compare and contrast against prior circuit de-
cisions in an effort to offer much needed clarity and hope-filled direction to
injured parties.
THE CASE
Plaintiff, identified as Doe to protect her identity, joined Mercy Catholic
Medical Center’s (“Mercy”) radiology residency program as a second year
resident (or “R2”) in 2011.12Mercy’s residency program offered training by
providing both hands-on experience and didactic teaching in the community-
based hospital setting.13 Radiology residents attended daily morning lectures
presented by faculty, attended afternoon case presentations, completed man-
datory classes, attended monthly radiology lectures and society meetings,
and sat for annual examinations to assess residents’ progress and compe-
tence.14
Plaintiff filed a private civil action against Mercy, claiming sexual harass-
ment and retaliation.15 Dr. James Roe, Director of Mercy’s residency pro-
gram, stood at the center of Plaintiff’s claims. Dr. Roe’s alleged behavior
displayed persistence in pursuing a relationship with Plaintiff. 16According
to Plaintiff, Dr. Roe created opportunities to see and speak with her more
than would be expected, looked at her in a suggestive manner, wanted to meet
with her while attending a conference, and later initiated inappropriate phys-
ical contact with her after being reported a second time.17 Plaintiff’s attempts
to communicate her need for professionalism and lack of desire for a rela-
tionship were reported to Human Resources (HR).18 Plaintiff was later placed
on a corrective action plan.19 On April 20, 2013, Plaintiff received a termi-
nation letter fromMercy that also stated that she could appeal the decision.20
Despite her efforts, Plaintiff’s appeal was denied and she declined to bring
another appeal.21As a result, no other residency program accepted her, which
blocked her from full licensure.22
12. Id. at 550.
13. Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 550 (3rd Cir. 2017).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 552.
16. Id. at 550.
17. Id. at 550-51.
18. Id. at 550.
19. Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 551 (3rd Cir. 2017).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 552.
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Plaintiff filed a claim against Mercy exactly two years after she learned
she had been dismissed.23 Plaintiff alleged six claims against Mercy, includ-
ing three under Title IX: retaliation, quid pro quo, and hostile environment;
and three under Pennsylvania law: contract-based sex discrimination, wrong-
ful termination, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.24
Plaintiff never filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) under Title VII.25 The District Court dismissed the Ti-
tle IX complaints for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.26
The lower court held: (1) Title IX did not apply because Mercy is not an
“education program or activity” under 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); (2) even if Title
IX applied, Plaintiff cannot use Title IX to circumvent Title VII’s adminis-
trative requirements; and (3) Congress intended Title VII to be the “exclusive
avenue for relief” for employment discrimination.27
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the hostile
environment claim, but held Plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation and quid pro quo
claims endured and reversed the dismissal of her state law claims.28 The court
determined Title VII was not the exclusive remedy for employment sex dis-
crimination cases and that Plaintiff may sue the hospital under Title IX,
avoiding the administrative requirements associated with Title VII.29 Plain-
tiff’s case was remanded for further proceedings.30
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit based its finding on four guid-
ing principles ascertained from prior United States Supreme Court cases.
The court first found that, despite Title VII’s range and comprehensive de-
sign to serve as a solution, employees who wish to file a private action are
not limited to Title VII in their search for relief from employment discrimi-
nation.31 Second, the court found that Congress determines, by manner of
policy and statutory construction, whether another form of relief would cir-
cumvent the administrative process required under Title VII.32 Courts inter-
pret statutes and should not fill the silence or attempt to augment the statute
by incorporating guidelines that are not there.33 Third, the court reasoned that
Congress could have easily identified beneficiaries, a specific class, or a par-
ticular group of people to be protected within the statute rather than using
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 552 (3rd Cir. 2017).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 566.
29. Id. at 563.
30. Id. at 567.
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broad language to refer to protected parties under Title IX.34 Congress also
could have included exempt parties in its exceptions to exclude individuals
who were not meant to be protected by Title IX.35 Finally, the court con-
cluded that Congress provided remedies that sometimes overlap; Title IX
may be an avenue for relief while Title VII may be as well.36 Title VII pro-
tects against discrimination while intentional discrimination, such as retalia-
tion or quid pro quo harassment, may serve as cause for a Title IX private
action.37
BACKGROUND
Title IX states that, “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”38 Title VI, which only bars discrimination
based on race, color, and national origin, served as a model for Title IX.39
Title IX addresses sex/gender discrimination and empowers agencies to re-
strict funding from educational institutions that engage in such discrimina-
tion.40
Under Title IX, individuals are ensured equal opportunity “to pursue, en-
gage or participate in, and benefit from academic, extracurricular, research,
occupational training, employment, or other educational programs or activi-
ties” without regard to sex.41 This protection covers all aspects of employ-
ment including, but not limited to, selection, hiring, compensation, benefits,
job assignments and classification, promotions, demotions, tenure, training,
transfers, leave, layoffs, and termination.42 Title IX broadens the scope of
educational programs to noneducational institutions such as prisons, muse-
ums, and job training institutes.43 Furthermore, “program or activity” is in-
terpreted in 20 U.S.C. § 1687 as “all of the operations” of several different
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 563-64.
37. Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 562 (3rd Cir. 2017).
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
39. Dep’t. of Just., Title IX Legal Manual, Part I. Overview of Title IX: Interplay of Title IX with
Title Vi, Section 504, Title VII, and the Fourteenth Amendment, https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix.
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
41. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal
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entities outlined within the statute that extend beyond the borders of a uni-
versity’s campus who also receive federal funding.44 Most notably, as men-
tioned in Mercy Catholic, § 1687(3)(A) highlights “an entire corporation,
partnership, or other private organization, or an entire sole proprietorship—
(i) if assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, private organi-
zation, or sole proprietorship as a whole; or (ii) which is principally engaged
in the business of providing education, health care, housing, social services,
or parks and recreation. *”45
Title IX does not have the administrative hurdles indicative of Title VII
but does require an appropriate person to have notice of the alleged discrim-
ination so the organization or institution has an opportunity to address it.
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago identified a dual purpose Congress sought to
achieve under Title IX: the intent to avoid the use of federal funding to sup-
port discriminatory practices, and to also provide individuals with effective
protection against discriminatory practices.46 The Court rationalized this in-
terpretation by presenting the danger of extremes.47 If the only purpose of
Title IX was to restrict funding, the termination of funds would be too severe
if based on only one occurrence of discriminatory practices.48 In addition, the
burden placed upon an individual to substantiate such inappropriate conduct
would be undue and nonsensical when an individual’s only interest is to pro-
tect themselves.49 The Court further held that the statute’s silence and failure
to create an express remedy is insufficient for refusing to imply an appropri-
ate remedy for individuals wishing to pursue a private action.50
There would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individ-
ual persons if Congress, instead of drafting Title IX with an unmistakable
focus on the benefited class, had written it simply as a ban on discriminatory
conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition against the dis-
bursement of public funds to educational institutions engaged in discrimi-
natory practices.51
Thus, the statute’s failure to create or deny a private remedy indicated Con-
gress’ intent for individuals to have a private remedy available to them.
N. Haven Brd. of Educ. v. Bell expanded upon Cannon by holding that
Title IX also prohibits employment discrimination.52 The statute refers to par-
44. 20 U.S.C § 1687 (2016).
45. 20 U.S.C. § 1687(3)(A) (emphasis added).
46. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1961 (1979).
47. Id. at 744, 99 S. Ct. at 1982.
48. Id. at 705, 99 S. Ct. at 1962.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 739, 99 S. Ct. at 1979, n.11.
51. Id. at 690-93, 99 S. Ct. at 1954-955.
52. North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982).
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ties protected as “persons” rather than restricting its scope to students or an-
other type of beneficiary of educational programs or activities.53 Title IX does
not expressly or impliedly exclude employees from its protection or reach.54
Furthermore, the exceptions included in the statute identify a number of en-
tities and persons who are exempt, but employees are not included.55 The
Court held that, “if we are to give [Title IX] the scope that its origins dictate,
we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.”56
Circuits are split as to whether Title VII is the exclusive remedy for em-
ployment sex discrimination cases. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have held
that employees’ remedy for sex discrimination is exclusively through a Title
VII action.57 In contrast, the First and Fourth Circuits have held that employ-
ees are not limited to Title VII and may be awarded a remedy under a Title
IX private action.58
In Lakoski v. James, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed the lower court’s decision and held that Title VII was the ex-
clusive means of relief for employees alleging sex discrimination against fed-
erally funded educational institutions.59 In Lakoski, the plaintiff was a colle-
giate professor who was denied tenure on several occasions and ultimately
terminated following her final appointment.60 The plaintiff alleged that her
evaluations required that she meet standards not required of her male col-
leagues.61 Rather than filing a charge with the EEOC pursuant to a Title VII
claim, she chose to pursue damages under Title IX.62 The plaintiff argued
that Cannon and North Haven, among other cases, provided an implied pri-
vate right of action for employment sex discrimination.63 The court rejected
the plaintiff’s argument stating Cannon was inapplicable because the case
involved prospective students and North Haven challenged the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare’s authority to terminate funding in an ef-
fort to regulate employment practices.64 Further, the court stated that neither
case required the court to address the relationship between Title VII and Title
IX.65 The court continued by characterizing Title VII’s presence in Cannon
53. Id. at 520, 102 S. Ct. at 1918.
54. Id. at 521, 102 S. Ct. at 1918.
55. Id. at 522, 102 S. Ct. at 1918.
56. Id. at 521, 102 S. Ct. at 1918.
57. James, 66 F.3d at 758; Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d at 866.
58. Lippsett, 864 F.2d at 897; Preston, 31 F.3d at 208.
59. James, 66 F.3d 751.
60. Id. at 752.
61. Id. at 753.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 754.
65. Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 758, 754 (5th Cir. 1995).
7
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and North Haven as merely “hover[ing] on the distant horizon...”66 Accord-
ing to the court, the plaintiff’s claim would, otherwise, “disrupt a carefully
balanced remedial scheme for redressing employment discrimination by em-
ployers.”67 In addition, Lakoski’s holding referenced 20 U.S.C. § 1682 which
states, in part, “[c]ompliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this
section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to
continue assistance under such program or activity.”68 Thus, the court held
that Congress intended termination of federal funding to be the sole remedy
expressly available for violations of Title IX,69 individuals may not bypass
Title VII’s administrative procedures by pursuing damages under Title IX,70
and Title VII excludes Title IX as a damages remedy for parties alleging em-
ployment discrimination.71
In Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., the Seventh Circuit also held that a
plaintiff’s only avenue to achieve “make-whole relief” was Title VII.72 The
plaintiff wished to file a claim against the school system alleging she was
denied a full-time teaching position because of her sex.73 She wished to file
a claim under Title IX in addition to her successful claim she previously filed
under Wisconsin’s Fair Employment Act.74 The court stated that a plaintiff
is required to only sue under a particular statute if Congress intended it to be
the exclusive way for vindication.75 According to the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, Title IX serves its purpose by providing schools with a strong
incentive to adopt and administer policies that protect civil rights.76 If educa-
tional institutions do not “adequately safeguard the civil rights of their stu-
dents and employees, Title IX provides that they may lose the funds supplied
by a myriad of federal agencies.”77 Thus, plaintiffs must seek equitable relief
under Title VII if the administrative requirements prove insufficient in
providing adequate relief.
In contrast, the First Circuit held that a plaintiff could file private actions
against educational institutions under Title IX if the plaintiff could show: (1)
university officials knew or should have known of hostile environment sex-
ual harassment and (2) the plaintiff was discharged by university officials
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. James, at 754; 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
69. James, at 754.
70. Id. at 758.
71. Id. at 755.
72. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., at 862.
73. Id. at 860.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 861.
76. Id. at 862.
77. Id.
8
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because of her sex.78 In Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., a medical resident filed a
claim against the University of Puerto Rico alleging she was sexually har-
assed while in residency and later dismissed from the program because of her
sex.79 The Court referred to the House Report and determined it strongly sug-
gested Congress intended the same substantive standards of Title VII to apply
to Title IX.80
One of the single most important pieces of legislation which has prompted
the cause of equal employment opportunity is Tile VII of the Civil Rights
1$? #D 8+02* .:>?9E 477/ @#)E<EC/ A!E$>D>$699& E($9="EA E"=$6?>#% >%A?>?=-
tions from its terms. [Title IX] would remove that exemption and bring
those in education under the equal employment provision.81
Therefore, Title IX ensures individuals are protected in all settings and, in
turn, provides employees of educational institutions, programs, and activities
with an additional avenue in their search for relief.
In Preston v. Commonwealth of Va. ex. rel. New River Cmty. Coll., the
Fourth Circuit aligned with the First Circuit.82 In Preston, the plaintiff
brought a private action against New River Community College alleging the
defendant retaliated against her for filing a claim of discrimination with the
EEOC.83 The court cited Cannon and held that an implied right of action
exists for enforcement of Title IX and extends to employment discrimination
on the basis of gender in educational institutions who are recipients of federal
funds.84 While the plaintiff was not ultimately victorious because evidence
showed she would not have been selected for the position, her claim was not
dismissed because Title IX did not imply a right to file a private action.85
Two principles are necessary to establish a violation of Title IX: (1) the peti-
tioner was excluded from participation because of her sex and (2) the educa-
tional programs were receiving federal funding at the time the plaintiff was
excluded.86
ANALYSIS
The Third Circuit’s decision in Mercy Catholic provided a thoughtful and
structurally-sound blueprint in its interpretation of Title IX’s intended pur-
pose to provide shelter to those in need of its refuge. By building upon the
78. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 914.
79. Id. at 884.
80. Id. at 897.
81. H.R. Rep. No. 554, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News
2462, 2512.
82. Preston, 31 F.3d 203.
83. Id. at 205.
84. Id. at 205-06.
85. Id. at 208-09.
86. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680, 99 S. Ct. at 1949.
9
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cornerstones of Cannon and North Haven, Mercy Catholic appropriately
painted broad strokes in applying Title IX’s sweeping language while also
zeroing in on the clear purpose of Congress to implement a means of account-
ability for federally funded educational programs and activities while also
protecting those employees who may be exposed to harmful, discriminatory
practices.Mercy Catholic highlighted the flaws present in the Fifth Circuit’s
and the Seventh Circuit’s decisions that limited Congress’ intent and joined
the First and Fourth Circuit in building upon those cornerstone cases already
secured.
First, Title VII does not preempt other alternatives available for relief in
private employment. In Johnson v. Ry Express Agency, Inc., the plaintiff
wished to file a race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in addition
to filing an EEOC charge.87 The United States Supreme Court rejected the
argument that filing a claim under § 1981 wrongly permitted the plaintiff to
circumvent Title VII’s administrative requirements.88 In the decision, the
Court stated that there were times when one approach may be more favorable
than another depending upon the circumstances of that particular situation.
Conciliation and persuasion through the [EEOC’s] administrative process
[under Title VII] . . . often constitute a desirable approach to settlement of
disputes based on sensitive and emotional charges of invidious employment
discrimination. We recognize, too, that the filing of a lawsuit . . . might tend
to deter efforts at conciliation, that lack of success in the legal action could
weaken the [EEOC’s] efforts to induce voluntary compliance, and that a
suit is privately oriented and narrow, rather than broad, in application, as
successful conciliation tends to be. But these are the natural effects of the
choice Congress has made available to the claimant by its conferring upon
him independent administrative and judicial remedies. The choice is a val-
uable one. Under some circumstances, the administrative route may be
highly preferred over the litigatory; under others the reverse may be true.89
Thus, the pursuit of an alternative means of relief is not an intentional ma-
neuver to evade the EEOC administrative process associated with Title VII.
Rather, a private employee’s decision may be the best strategy based on sur-
rounding circumstances. Mercy Catholic appropriately cited and concurred
with Johnson in its opinion by also underlining Johnson’s point that Con-
gress “provided a variety of remedies, at times overlapping, to eradicate em-
ployment discrimination.”90 Therefore, it is of no consequence whether or
87. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 95 S. Ct. 1716 (1975).
88. Id. at 460, 95 S. Ct. at 1720.
89. Mercy Catholic, 850 F.3d at 560 (quoting Johnson, at 461, 95 S. Ct. at 1720) (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 561.
10
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not an employee could proceed under Title VII—such a course does not, ex-
pressly or impliedly, eliminate other alternatives potentially available for re-
lief.
Second, Title IX’s language referring to members of the protected class as
“persons” includes employees.91 20 U.S.C. § 1681(1) – (9) outlines a number
of entities that are exempt from Title IX’s reach.92 Employees are not in-
cluded in the list of exceptions.93 Furthermore, Congress could have specifi-
cally identified Title IX’s beneficiaries by substituting “students” or another
narrowly identifiable class to reflect their purpose in writing this protective
provision. Lakoski improperly refused to apply Cannon and North Haven be-
cause those cases did not require an analysis of the relationship between Title
IX and Title VII.94 In contrast, Preston ’ s first principle necessary to establish
a Title IX violation was that the petitioner was excluded from participation
because of her sex.95 Building upon Cannon and North Haven, Preston chose
language that mirrored the spirit of Title IX’s language by choosing not to
assume displaced responsibility in their interpretation. If Congress intended
to only protect students, that intent would have been evident and carefully
worded to aid in the law’s interpretation.
Finally, termination of federal funding is not the only remedy available
under Title IX. The Fifth Circuit advocated for the “balanced remedial
scheme” established in these sections to redress employment discrimination
by basing their finding on § 1682 of Title IX.96 The Court held that termina-
tion of federal funding was the exclusive means of relief under Title IX.97
However, there are two options within the statute in response to failure to
comply: (1) termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance or (2)
by any other means authorized by law.98 Cannon warned of the danger in
limiting relief to termination of federal funding.99 If the only remedy for non-
compliance is a refusal to grant or continue to offer financial assistance, the
response may be too severe if the decision was based on only one finding.100
In addition, the responsibility placed upon an individual to prove an institu-
tion’s failure to comply would be unduly burdensome and unreasonable
91. Id. at 562.
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2011).
93. Id.
94. James, 66 F.3d at 753-54.
95. Preston, 31 F.3d at 206.
96. Mercy Catholic, 850 F.3d at 563.
97. James, 66 F.3d at 754.
98. 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
99. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 705, 99 S. Ct. at 1962.
100. Id.
11
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when the victim’s only purpose is to protect their own interests.101 The sec-
ond option, “by any means authorized by law,” effectively opens the door to
imply a cause of action providing remedies to the injured party.
CONCLUSION
Mercy Catholic arrived at the proper conclusion by acknowledging Plain-
tiff’s ability to pursue alternative remedies in her search for relief notwith-
standing the fact that those remedies may overlap. The Third Circuit also
appropriately aligned their stance with North Haven by including employees
as members of the class of “persons” identified in the statute. Mercy Catho-
lic’s recognition of remedies available under Title IX resulted in Plaintiff’s
case being remanded for further proceedings so victory in her search for relief
could be a renewed possibility. The Third Circuit artfully applied and ce-
mented each piece of the puzzle in their decision. Armed with proper inter-
pretation and perspective, the Third Circuit may positively impact victims
within its region and hopefully inspire resolution among the circuits so that
all who suffer discrimination based on sex can be made whole.
101. Id.
12
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